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CHAPTER I 
MORAL ORIENTATION 
Every day there are countless numbers of decisions made, actions 
taken, and problems wrestled with. These are aspects of life we are all 
familiar with. But why do some people faced with seemingly similar 
situations choose to act in opposite ways? Why do certain situations 
and actions pose thorny problems for some people but not others? The 
answers to these and similar questions lie in the different ways people 
characteristically meet life and the ways in which they experience and 
define their world. Understanding these various approaches to living is 
fundamental to an undestanding of human beings. 
This study examines how people approach one area of social life, 
the moral domain. Moral domain and morality are difficult concepts to 
define. Many competing and widely divergent definitions have been pro-
posed, none of which can ulimately be justified on purely rational 
grounds (Macintyre, 1984). In this study, no definition of morality is 
put forth although certain assumptions about its nature are made. The 
term morality will be used to refer to the problem of what is right or 
wrong in the conduct of an individual as it affects his or her own life 
and the lives of other persons in the group. This morality is consid-
ered to be a product of the person's reciprocal interaction with the 
environment and to have both cognitive and affective components. Com-
1 
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mitment to a moral code (the rules, principles, and values that regulate 
moral conduct) is seen as depending on the use of reason and also on 
attachment to other persons and to social groups. Other researchers, 
such as Vine (1983), have also conceptualized morality in this way. 
In this project it is also assumed that within the limits of the 
above co~ceptualization, people have different orientations toward mor-
ality. That is, that they construct, resolve, and evaluate moral prob-
lems in their lives in characteristically different ways. This means 
that one person's moral conflict may not be another's and the same moral 
issue may be seen in a variety of ways. One purpose of this project is 
to assess the kinds of moral orientations young adults evidence in their 
descriptions of real-life moral dilemmas. 
Moral orientation is only a single aspect of a person's function-
ing. It does not exist in isolation and it is expected to be related to 
other characteristics of the person. The larger purpose of this study 
is to investigate the relations among the moral orientations of young 
adults and the person variables of ego development, sex, and individual 
differences 'in motives of intimacy and power. 
I will proceed by first describing the care and justice moral ori-
entations (MOs) and some criticisms of the dominant model of moral 
development that are relevant to this study. In later chapters I will 
discuss those factors expected to be related to moral orientation. 
Carol Gilligan (1982) hypothesized the existence of two different 
orientations toward morality, one centered around an ethic of care and 
responsibility and the other around an ethic of justice. These two ori-
3 
entations define morality differently and are based upon different 
perceptions of experience, self, and relationships to others. As a 
result, the conflictual issues, mode of moral reasoning and moral con-
duct vary with the type of orientation. 
In the care MO, morality is defined interpersonally in terms of 
responsibilities in relationships. Individuals with a care MO perceive 
themselves as intimately connected to others. Their moral conflicts 
take the form of a problem in relationships (e.g., self versus others' 
needs) and center around issues of selfishness, attachment, and respon-
sibility to others. For them, to act morally is to respond to others in 
others' terms, that is, by "considering their situations as if one were 
in them oneself" (Lyons, 1983, p. 135). People with a care orientation 
take moral action in consideration of the consequences to all involved. 
Their thinking is practical, contextual, and inductive. 
In the justice orientation, morality is a matter of abstract prin-
ciples and individual's rights. Persons with a justice MO view them-
selves as essentially separate from others. Their conflicts involve 
exercising their own rights without interfering with the rights of oth-
ers. To act morally is "to treat others as you would like to be 
treated" (Lyons, 1983). Their moral dilemmas consist of conflicting 
principles or standards and arise over issues of equality, fairness and 
the protection of rights. Their mode of reasoning is abstract, objec-
tive, and logically formal. 
answer exists. 
They assume that a universally "right" 
These two orientations are not mutually exclusive. Gilligan sug-
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gests that women are more likely to hold a care MO and men a justice MO 
possibly because of differing social .experiences. However, she adds 
that these two orientations are complementary rather then opposing and 
that the developmental task for both sexes is to recognize the value of 
the other perspective and integrate it into a more comprehensive moral-
ity of rights and responsibilities. 
Gilligan's thesis challenges the currently dominant psychological 
model of moral development, that of Lawrence Kohl berg (1968, 1976, 
1981). Kohlberg has proposed a cognitive-structural model of moral 
development. According to Kohlberg, moral development occurs through 
the progressive transformation of basic cognitive structures. Cognitive 
structures (products of the individual and his or her interaction with 
the environment) are the rules, procedures, and processes that the per-
son uses to organize and interpret experience. As development proceeds, 
these structures become increasingly differentiated, integrated and com-
plex. Kohlberg has identified a hierarchical, invariant sequence of 
moral reasoning stages with each stage characterized by the use of a 
specific cognitive structure. (See Table 1.) As the person moves up 
the hierarchy the cognitive structure employed becomes more and more 
adequate for making moral decisions. 
Kohlberg and those researchers using his system assess moral 
development with his Moral Judgment Interview or some variation of it. 
This method of assessment requires the subject to respond to a hypothet-
ical moral conflict situation by telling what the protagonist of the 
Table 1 
Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Reasoning 
Level I - PRECONVENTIONAL 
Stage 1 
Punishment and obedience orientation 
Stage 2 
Instrumental relativist orientation 
(continued) 
What is Right 
Goodness and badness of 
an action determined by 
its physical consequences; 
obedience for its own 
sake. 
Right action is that which 
meets one's own interests 
or needs or those of others. 
Right is also what's fair, 
a deal, an agreement. 
Reasons for Doing Right 
Avoidance of punishment, 
and the superior power of 
authorities. 
To serve one's own 
interests while recogniz-
ing that other's have 
their own interests, too. 
Table 1 (continued) 
Level II - CONVENTIONAL 
Stage 3 
Interpersonal concordance or "good 
boy - nice girl" orientation 
Stage 4 
Law and order orientation 
What is Right 
"Being good" is important 
and means having good mo-
tives, showing concern for 
others and living up to 
people's expectations of 
you. It also means keeping 
mutual relationships such 
as trust, loyalty, respect 
and gratitude, 
Doing one's duty, showing 
respect for others, and 
maintaining the social order 
for it's own sake. Uphold-
ing the law. 
Reasons for Doing Right 
To be a good person in 
your own eyes and those 
of others. Belief in the 
Golden Rule. Desire to 
maintain and support the 
social order 
To keep the institution 
going as a whole, to avoid 
the breakdown in the sys-
tem "if everyone did it." 
To satisfy one's defined 
obligations. 
Table 1 (continued) 
Level III - POST-CONVENTIONAL OR 
PRINCIPLED 
Stage 5 
Social-contract, legalistic, 
utilitarian orientation 
Stage 6 
Universal ethical principles 
a Adapted from Kohlberg, 1976 
What is Right 
Right action defined in 
terms of general indi-
vidual rights and in 
tenns of standards which 
have been agreed upon by 
society. Awareness of 
the relativism of most 
values and rules and the 
universality of others 
such as life and liberty. 
Right is defined by the 
decision of conscience in 
accord with self-chosen 
ethical principles that are 
universal principles of 
justice; the equality of 
human rights. 
Reasons for Doing Right 
A sense of obligation to 
law because of one's 
social contract to make 
and keep laws for the 
welfare of all and the 
protection of rights. 
Emphasis on procedural 
rules for reaching consen-
sus. "The greatest good 
for the greatest number." 
The belief as a rational 
person in the validity of 
universal, abstract moral 
principles and a sense 
of personal commitment to 
them, Recognition that 
persons are ends in them-
selves and must be treated 
as such. 
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dilemma should do and then justifying that course of action. The sub-
ject's moral reasoning is elicited in either a free-response (interview) 
or standardized questionnaire mode (Rest, 1975) and then scored for 
developmental level. The subject is assigned a stage score (i.e., moral 
maturity level) corresponding to the structure of his or her moral rea-
soning. 
The Kohlbergian model is based on a liberal, individualist, jus-
tice-based ethic and in it a "more adequate" moral judgment refers to a 
"more adequate" comprehension of what is most just or fair. Kohlberg's 
model embodies the justice orientation described by Gilligan, and she 
accepts it as being applicable to one aspect of moral development and 
understanding. She also adopts, as does Kohlberg, a constructivist and 
developmental approach to understanding morality. However, she opposes 
his assumption that justice lies at the core of all morality and that 
the use of formal, abstract reasoning is the most important component in 
moral decision-making. 
Kohl berg's highly cognitive system gives little weight to irra-
tional but morally relevant emotions such as compassion, sympathy and 
love and deals primarily with prohibition-oriented dilemmas. Gilligan 
and others (Gilligan, 1982; Haan, 1978; Kurdek, 1981) charge that with 
its emphasis on formal, logical thought and the resolution of abstract, 
hypothetical dilemmas, it focuses on only one type of moral understand-
ing to the exclusion of other, different conceptions of morality. This 
may account for there being little evidence to show any consistent rela-
tion between moral structure and moral conduct (Blasi, 1980; Haan, 1978) 
9 
or between moral reasoning in a hypothetical versus real situation 
(Gilligan & Belenky, 1980; Haan, 1975, 1978). 
Gilligan claims that to find evidence of these differing concep-
tions one should look at people's spontaneous thinking about their 
real-life moral problems. Gilligan herself did this, deriving much of 
her own t_heory from a series of three studies she conducted to assess 
the relations between subjects' view of themselves and their thinking 
about morality to their experiences of moral conflict and the making of 
life choices. 
The subjects in these studies (male and female) participated in 
semi-structured interviews in which they were told to describe them-
selves and asked how they defined morality and what kinds of experiences 
they interpreted as conflicts in their lives. She found evidence for 
two distinct approaches to morality which she subsequently called the 
care and justice moral orientations. 
The validity of her evidence has not gone unchallenged, however. 
Broughton (1983) has criticized Gilligan for selectively presenting 
excerpts from the interview data that support her theory while failing 
to present contrary evidence contained within the interviews. He re-an-
alyzed, in their entirety, several of the interviews that Gilligan had 
presented in support of her theory. He concluded that there was no 
strong evidence that women reasoned differently than men. 
The purpose of the present study is to gain a better understanding 
of the care and justice orientations and the factors related to them. 
As in Gilligans' research, subjects will be asked to describe their own 
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experiences of moral conflict rather than being presented with moral 
problems. In this way, those elements associated with the two orienta-
tions will be given greatest freedom to appear. A given individual's 
moral orientation influences that individual's definition of moral 
dilemmas as well as his/her moral reasoning and conduct. Therefore, the 
character,istics of moral conflicts are expected to differ for people 
with a care MO as opposed to those with a justice MO and it is expected 
that these differences will be reflected in their descriptions of the 
moral conflicts that they have experienced. 
This study will also examine three factors expected to be related 
to MO. An important feature of both Gilligan's and Kohl berg's theories 
is the constructivist view of human development and nature adopted in 
each. This view is, as noted earlier, the assumption that human beings 
are in an interactive and reciprocal relationship with the external 
world and they affect that world. It assumes that humans actively con-
struct their experience, including moral experience. Moral orientation 
refers to the ways in which a person characteristically constructs his/ 
her moral experience. This study will examine three variables (sex, 
stage of ego development, and motive) that are hypothesized to influence 
peoples' constructions of experience and are therefore expected to be 
related to moral orientation. In the following sections, a more 
detailed presentation of these variables and their expected relation-
ships to MO will be made. 
CHAPTER II 
SEX DIFFERENCES IN MORAL ORIENTATION 
Kohlberg's theory of moral development and his scoring system have 
been criticized for being sex-biased (Gilligan, 1982; Haan, 1977; 
Holstein, 1976). Gilligan asserts that Kohlberg's model emphasizes tra-
ditionally masculine values such as rationality, individuality, imper-
sonality and justice, and places less importance on feminine concerns 
for welfare, caring, and responsibility. This results in women being 
placed at lower stages than men because their traditional orientation to 
empathy, and concern for and sensitivity to the needs of others is asso-
ciated with Stage 3 reasoning (a less advanced stage) in Kohlberg's sys-
tern. 
Gilligan theorized that men and women, as a group, have qualita-
tively different orientations toward morality (i.e., care vs. justice) 
because of differing perceptions of self, other and relationships. She 
states: 
The moral judgments of women differ from those of men in the greater 
extent to which women's judgments are tied to feelings of empathy 
and compassion and are concerned with the resolution of real as 
opposed to hypothetical dilemmas (1982, p. 68). 
Gilligan formulated an alternative stage sequence for the develop-
ment of women's moral reasoning that revolves around changes in self-
concept and in the understanding of the relationship between self and 
11 
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other. Movement proceeds from an initial concern with survival and the 
self as the sole object of concern (Level I), to a focus on "goodness" 
as self-sacrifice (Level II), and finally, to an adoption of non-vio-
lence and caring as a universal obligation and the most adequate guide 
to the resolution of conflict in human relationships (Level III). The 
central moral problem for women is the conflict between self and other; 
i.e., how to maintain connection and care for others while still valuing 
oneself. Transition between stages involves a re-interpretation of the 
conflict between selfishness and responsibility. 
Gilligan describes female gender identity as being defined through 
attachment. For women, the self is experienced as intrinsically con-
nected to others. Their very sense of being initially comes through 
connection and is maintained through connection (e.g., the mother-daugh-
ter relationship). Women perceive the world as a "web" of human rela-
tionships and within this web the primary moral problem is how to care 
best for all involved, or alternatively, how to inflict the least hurt. 
Women's strongest qualities are those associated with relationship such 
as empathy, ·nurturance, caring, interpersonal responsibility, interde-
pendence,- and sensitivity and responsiveness to the needs of others. 
These qualities are reflected in the ways women construct, resolve, and 
evaluate moral problems. 
Gilligan proposes that for men, however, identity is defined 
through separation (e.g., becoming distinct from mother). A man's most 
basic experience of himself is as a separate individual. His world is 
that of a "hierarchy of conflicting rights" (Reimer, 1983) held together 
13 
by systems of rules. Each person is striving to achieve his or her own 
aims in an equitable and just fashion. The fundamental moral concern is 
how to apply principles of fairness and equality to opposing claims. 
Masculine strengths are those qualities associated with autonomy, indi-
viduation, and formal systems and include mastery, assertion, rational-
ity and ,logical thought. 
orientation to morality. 
These qualities are expressed in a justice 
In summary, Gilligan postulates that males and females have dif-
ferent perceptions of self, others, and relationships and show strengths 
in different areas of personality functioning (e.g., empathy vs. mas-
tery). These differences are manifested in the adoption of either the 
care or justice orientations to real-life moral dilemmas. 
There is evidence to support Gilligan's hypotheses about masculine 
and feminine functioning although not necessarily her notions of care 
and justice ethics. Carlson (1971) conducted a series of studies to 
assess sex differences in personality functioning. In his first study, 
Carlson asked male and female college students to do a series of tasks 
designed to· assess their representations of self, others, and experi-
ence. There were 37 males and 39 females in his sample. Subjects were 
required to complete an adjective checklist and Kelly's Role Construct 
Repertory Test (self-representation); to write a brief personality 
sketch of someone they knew fairly well (representation of others); to 
write a description of the physical environment of their childhood 
milieu (representation of physical space); and to describe the type of 
person they expected to be in 15 years and what they expected to be 
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doing (representation of time). His results indicated that, in general, 
males represent experiences of self, others, space and time in indivi-
dualistic, objective, and distant ways while females represent the same 
experiences in relatively interpersonal, subjective and immediate ways. 
Males tended to differentiate themselves from their environment while 
women experienced themselves as intrinsically connected to their milieu 
and to others. 
In a second study, Carlson asked male and female college students 
to describe critical experiences of seven affects. These were the neg-
ative affects of shame, fear, anger and disgust, and the positive 
affects of joy, excitement and surprise. He found that a larger propor-
tion of males than females described incidents involving such themes as 
achievement, separateness, aggression and sexuality as drive or con-
quest. A greater proportion of females reported experiences of social 
acceptance, togetherness, receptivity, dependence, altruism, and sexual-
ity as belonging. 
Carlson did not attribute these differences in personality func-
tioning to sex, per se, as there was considerable overlap between males 
and females in the studies he conducted. Rather, he explained them in 
terms of Bakan's formulation of agency and communion (1966) which acco-
modates sex differences as well as overlap. Bakan's theory and its rel-
evance to moral orientation will be discussed more fully in the later 
section on power and intimacy motives. 
More recently, Lyons (1983) directly tested several hypotheses 
derived from Gilligan's theory. She studied a group of 36 people con-
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sisting of 2 males and 2 females at each of the following ages: 8, 11, 
14-15, 19-22, 27, 36, 45, and 60 or more years. The subjects were given 
a semi-structured interview designed to assess how individuals construct 
their experiences of self and the moral domain. The data were analyzed 
for modes of self-definition (separate or connected), moral orientation 
within considerations of real-life moral dilemmas (care or justice), and 
correlations between mode of self-definition and moral orientation. In 
general, her results supported the hypotheses that there are two differ-
ent orientations toward morality (care and justice) and that these ori-
entations are not mutually exclusive al though individuals usually use 
one mode predominantly. 
Lyons also investigated sex differences in self-definition and 
understandings of relationships and their relation to moral orientation. 
She found that women more frequently characterized themselves and their 
relationships to others in terms of connection while men more frequently 
did this in terms of a separate/objective self. As regards moral orien-
tation, Lyons found that females more frequently evidenced a care ethic 
and men a justice ethic. However, regardless of sex, those individuals 
characterizing themselves predominantly in connected terms most fre-
quently used a care and responsibility orientation while those individu-
als characterizing themselves in separate/objective terms used a rights 
and justice orientation. Her results also suggested that there are dis-
tinctive kinds of developmental shifts for men and women in the fre-
quency of their use of the two orientations, with women after age 27 
showing increased consideration of rights in their conceptualizations of 
16 
morality, and adolescent males showing a greater consideration of 
response than males at other ages. She concluded that the relationship 
between sex and MO i~ not a simple one and that ''in real-life moral con-
flict, individuals ... call upon and think about both care and justice 
considerations but use predominantly one mode which is related to but 
not defined or confined to an individual by virtue of gender" (p. 138). 
Numerous studies have examined sex differences in specific quali-
ties that logically may be associatd with either the care or justice 
orientations to morality. However, research in the area of sex differ-
ences is fraught with problems (Deaux, 1984; Jacklin, 1981) and the lit-
erature is often conflicting and difficult to interpret. It must be 
remembered, also, that even when studies show sex differences in con-
structs that are related to Gilligan's theory, these studies are not 
direct tests of her theory and therefore provide only indirect support 
for her claim that there are differences in the morality of men and 
women. With that said, a presentation and discussion of some of the 
conclusions regarding male and female functioning in areas related to 
morality (a.g., affiliation, nurturance, helping behavior, and empathy) 
is made in the following paragraphs. 
In support of Gilligan's hypotheses, reviewers have found females 
to be more affiliative than males in both self-report and fantasy 
(Tavris & Offer, 1977), and behavior (Hoyenga & Hoyenga, 1979). Females 
also tend to concentrate their social life in a few close attachments 
while males' social life tends to be diffused over many superficial 
relationships (Seward & Seward, 1984). In addition, females in compari-
17 
son to males have been found to be more nurturant, (Seward & Seward, 
1984), more likely to use nurturant behaviors when helping people with 
problems (Hoyenga & Hoyenga, 1979), more sensitive to social stimuli 
(Hayenga & Hoyenga, 1979), and more empathic (Hoffman, 1977). 
In contrast, other reviewers have concluded that there are no con-
sistent sex differences in affiliation (Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974), nurtu-
rance (Deux, 1984; Hayenga & Hayenga, 1979), prosocial orientation and 
altruistic behavior (Mussen & Eisenberg-Berg, 1977), or empathy (Maccoby 
& Jacklin, 1974). 
These opposing conclusions illustrate the impossibility of coming 
to any definitive conclusions regarding sex differences given the pres-
ent state of our knowledge in this area. Nevertheless, as methods and 
constructs become more refined, sex differences are sometimes revealed 
in areas where earlier they had not been thought to exist. The opposing 
conclusions of Hoffman and Maccoby and Jacklin regarding empathy is a 
case in point. As noted, Maccoby and Jacklin found no differences in 
empathy between males and females. Hoffman, however, came to a differ-
ent conclusion when employing a more specific definition of empathy than 
that used by Maccoby and Jacklin. He defined it as "the observer's 
vicarious affective response to another person" and differentiated it 
from cognitive perspective-taking skills (Maccoby and Jacklin did not). 
After analyzing those studies reviewed by Maccoby and Jacklin as well as 
more recent research, Hoffman concluded that females were more empathic 
than males throughout the life cycle, but that there were no differences 
in their respective abilities to recognize others' affective or cogni-
18 
tive states (i.e., perspective). 
Hoffman's findings are of special interest because they may help 
explain some of the differences in moral orientation found by Lyons 
(1983). Her results indicated that individuals with a justice orienta-
tion respond to others as they would like to be responded to if they 
were in t?e other's place. Those with a care orientation, on the other 
hand, respond to the other as the other would like to be responded to. 
This seems to imply the ability to imagine oneself as the other (and not 
simply oneself in the other's place) which may be related to a greater 
capacity to feel as the other feels. These two modes of responding, 
then, may reflect the difference between a cognitive understanding of 
the other's perspective versus an empathic experiencing of the other 
person's situation. 
The evidence thus far seems to support the hypothesis that differ-
ences in personality functioning are associated with different moral 
orientations, but is equivocal in regard to sex differences in specific 
traits or behaviors thought to be related to MO. There is some evidence 
for sex differences in moral orientation but this finding has not been 
replicated. 
Gilligan also made the assertion, noted previously, that women's 
greater use of the care ethic results in their being scored at a lower 
stage of moral development in Kohl berg's system than are males. This 
claim has not been supported by a recent comprehensive review of inves-
tigations utilizing Kohl berg's method of assessment (Walker, 1984). 
Walker analyzed 108 studies and found that only 8 of these significantly 
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favored males. Of these, several were methodologically flawed (e.g., 
sex and occupation/education were confounded) and most relied on early 
stage definitions and scoring procedures that have since been revised. 
As Walker points out, however, this does not necessarily mean that sex 
differences in moral reasoning do not ~xist. There are several possible 
explanatipns for a finding of no sex differences in moral judgment as 
assessed by Kohlberg's measure. For instance, the differences may exist 
in content within a stage (i.e., what the individual is valuing, judg-
ing, or appealing to; particular norms) or in the usage of a character-
istic orientation when making a moral judgment (Kohlberg, 1982). 
A study by Gibbs, Arnold and Burkhart (1984) lends support to 
these alternative explanations. They found no sex differences in stage 
level but they did find a difference in the kinds of justifications 
(modes of content usage) males and females use in support of their deci-
sions. The subjects (60 males and 118 females comparable in age, educa-
tion, and socioeconomic level) were given a paper and pencil measure of 
reflective moral thought that provided stage and content information. 
The experimenters discovered that a significantly greater number of 
females than males used empathic role taking as a reason for their moral 
judgment. In addition, females at this stage made a greater use of con-
science appeals (self-approval or -disapproval). The researchers 
hypothesized that these differences in content usage may be a reflection 
of a greater female orientation to empathy or caring. 
Another explanation for the finding of no sex differences in moral 
judgment stage might be that sex differences in preference for one or 
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the other orientation do exist, but that there are no differences in 
males' and females' abilities to utilize either orientation. That is, 
both sexes may be able to use the care and justice MOs equally well 
while preferring (given the choice) to use one over the other. If so, 
it is unlikely that such a difference would be revealed in moral reason-
ing appli,ed to hypothetical, abstract, justice- and rights- oriented 
dilemmas that "pull" for the use of a justice ethic. This study will 
attempt to avoid "pulling" for a specific orientation by asking subjects 
to describe their own experiences of moral conflict and then using these 
real-life dilemmas to test the hypotheses that females more frequently 
use a care than a justice MO and males more frequently use a justice 
than a care MO. 
CHAPTER III 
EGO DEVELOPMENT AND POWER AND INTIMACY MOTIVES 
Loevinger's Model of Ego Development 
Loevinger (1976) defines the ego as "the process that provides the 
frame of reference that structures one's world and within which one per-
ceives the world" (pp. 9-10). Her conception of the ego emphasizes the 
individual's integrative processes and the overall "framework of mean-
ing" (Hauser, 1976) the individual imposes on experience. Ego develop-
ment occurs through the progressive transformation of these frames of 
reference, with each succeeding frame or structure being represented by 
a stage further along the developmental continuum. Each step in the 
sequence must be completed before going on to the next although people 
proceed at different rates and all may not reach the later stages. 
Each ego stage is associated with a specific pattern of reasoning 
and bohavior and thus the developmental continuum provides a measure of 
individual differences. A person at a given stage exhibits a character-
istic orientation to self and world and develops a certain "character 
style." 
Ego development proceeds in the direction of a more integrated, 
complex, differentiated and comprehensive perception "of one's self, of 
the social world, and of the relation of one's feelings and thoughts to 
those of others" (Candee, 1974). Development occurs along the dimen-
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sions of impulse control (moral style), conscious concerns, and 
interpersonal and cognitive styles, and these dimensions differ for each 
stage. The seven stages and three transitional levels are shown in 
Table 2. 
Loevinger' s theory of ego development and Kohl berg's and 
Gilligan's theories of moral development all share an emphasis on frame-
works of meaning (i.e., the constructivist approach) and an assumption 
of sequential, hierarchical stages of development. Each stage is more 
complex than the last and involves a transformation in structure. 
There seems to be a similar developmental trend in all three mod-
els. The lower stages are marked by egocentricity and a concern with 
the self: with survival, one's own needs, reward and punishment. The 
next step involves an inclusion of the expectations anrl needs of others. 
This is expressed in the desire for external validation and approval and 
in adherance to group norms. At the higher and more abstract levels, 
there is equal valuing of self and other; recognition and toleration of 
internal conflict; and adherance to internal norms and standards not 
necessarily tied to conventional criteria or judgments. 
Loevinger considers moral development to be part of ego develop-
ment. In his review of the literature, Hauser (1976) reported a moder-
ate though inconsistent correlation between ego stages and Kohlberg' s 
moral development stages. More recently, Lutwak's (1984) results also 
support the conclusion that these two systems are related although each 
addresses reasonably separate areas of development. As Lutwak points 
out, ego development theory seems to have a broader focus than 
Table 2 
Stages of Ego Developmenta 
Stage 
Presocial (I-1) 
Symbiotic (I-1) 
Impulsive (I-2) 
Self-protective 
(Delta) 
Transition from 
self-protective 
to conformist 
(Delta/3) 
Conformist (I-3) 
(continued) 
Impulse control, 
"moral" style 
Impulsive, fear 
Fear of being 
caught, external-
izing blame, op-
portunistic 
Obedience and conf or-
mity to social 
norms; simple and 
absolute rules 
Conformity to exter-
nal rules, shame, 
guilt for breaking 
rules 
Interpersonal 
style 
Autistic 
Symbiotic 
Receiving, 
dependent, 
exploitive 
Wary, manipula-
tive, exploi-
tive 
Manipulative, 
obedient 
Belonging, help-
ing, super-
ficial niceness 
Conscious 
preoccupations 
Self v. non self 
Self v. non self 
Bodily feelings, 
especially 
sexual and ag-
gressive 
Self-protection, 
wishes, things, 
advantages, 
control 
Concrete aspects 
of traditional 
sex roles physi-
cal causation as 
opposed to psycho-
logical causation 
Appearance, social 
acceptability, 
banal feelings, 
behavior 
Cognitive 
style 
Stereotypy, con-
ceptual confu-
sion 
Conceptual s im-
plicit y' 
stereotypes 
Conceptual sim-
plicity, 
stereotypes, 
cliches 
N 
w 
Table 2 (continued) 
Stage 
Transition from 
conformist to 
conscientious; 
self-consciou-
ness (I-3/4) 
Conscientious 
(I-4) 
Transition from 
conscientious 
to autonomous 
(continued) 
Impulse control, 
"moral" style 
Dawning realiza-
tion of stan-
dards, contin-
gencies, self-
criticism 
Self-evaluated 
standards, self 
criticism 
Individuality, cop-
ing with inner 
conflict 
Interpersonal 
style 
Being helpful, 
deepened in-
terest in inter-
personal rela-
tions 
Conscious 
preoccupations 
Consciousness of 
the self as 
separate from 
the group, rec-
ognition of 
psychological 
causation 
Intensive, respon- Differentiated feel-
sible, mutual, ings, motives for 
concen1 for behavior, self-
conununication respect, achieve-
ments, traits, ex-
pression 
Cherishing of in-
terpersonal re-
lations 
Communicating, ex-
pressing ideas and 
feelings, process 
and change 
Cognitive 
style 
Awareness of in-
dividual dif-
ferences in 
attitudes, 
interests and 
abilities, 
mentioned in 
global and 
broad terms 
Conceptual com-
plexity, idea 
of patterning 
Toleration for 
paradox and 
contradiction 
N 
-~ 
Table 2 (continued) 
Stage 
Autonomous 
(I-5) 
Integrated 
(I-6) 
Impulse control, 
"moral"·style 
Add: Coping with 
conflictingb 
inner needs 
Add: Reconciling 
inner conflicts, 
renunciation of 
unat tginable 
goals 
Interpersonal 
style 
Add: Respect for 
autonomy 
Conscious 
preoccupations 
Vividly conveyed 
feeling; integra-
tion of physio-
logical and 
psychological 
causation of 
behavior; develop-
ment; role concep-
tion, self-ful-
fillment, self in 
social context 
Add: Cherishing Add: Identity 
of individuality 
aFrom Loevinger and Wessler, 1970; Hoppe, 1972. 
b"Add" means in addition to the description applying to the previous level. 
Cognitive 
style 
Increased con-
ceptual com-
plexity; com-
plex patterns, 
toleration for 
ambiguity, 
broad scope, 
objectivity 
N 
\JI 
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Kohlberg's model. It is concerned with global aspects of the self and 
both emotional and cognitive experience. Kohlberg focuses on a single 
facet of development, moral reasoning, and his model is almost exclu-
sively cognitive in orientation. 
The relationship between ego development and moral orientation 
has, to t,his researcher's knowledge, not yet been investigated. How-
ever, given that the care and justice orientations are tied to different 
experiences of self and other it is reasonable to expect that moral ori-
entation will be related to the changes in self and other perception 
that occur during ego development. The conflict between independence 
and dependence, between the self as separate and the self as connected, 
is a basic theme in ego development. Resolution, or at least tolera-
tion, of the conflict occurs only at the highest levels. At the lower 
ego stages the self appears to be experienced primarily as either sepa-
rate or as connected but not both. This may be due to the conceptual 
simplicity operating at these stages. At higher stages, however, these 
two polarities become progressively more integrated so that by Stage I-5 
an individua'l recognizes both the need for "and also the limitations to 
autonomy, that emotional interdependence is inevitable" (Loevinger, 
1976, p. 23). 
I described earlier how individuality and separateness are inte-
gral to the justice MO and connection and relationship are central to 
the care orientation. Further, these two orientations appear complemen-
tary and the integration of the two is a major developmental task. This 
leads to several hypotheses about the relationship between ego stage and 
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moral orientation. First, it is expected that individuals at lower 
stages of ego development (below I-4) will show primarily a justice or a 
care orientation in their descriptions of moral problems. Second, it is 
hypothesized that individuals at higher ego stages (I-4 and above) will 
show both the care and justice moral orientations in their descriptions 
of real-life moral dilemmas. 
Power and Intimacy Motives 
Motives are directing and energizing forces driving individuals to 
action and influencing which aspects of their environment are most 
salient to them. Motives point to a tendency or disposition on the part 
of the person. Individuals with a high degree of a given motive show a 
recurrent preference for certain kinds of behavior and experiences 
"within the context of constraints and opportunities afforded by the 
environment" (McAdams, 1985). 
People are impelled by a variety of motives. The two that I will 
focus upon in this study are motives of intimacy and power. The 
strength of .these motives is customarily assessed by means of the The-
matic Apperception Test. 
Intimacy motive guides the person towards communion and the merg-
ing of self, other, and environment. It is expressed interpersonally in 
closeness, openness, sharing, and cooperation. It is manifested in the 
desire for contact and communication with another. For example, 
research shows that individuals high in this motive spend a greater 
amount of time thinking about and communicating with people than those 
low in this motive (McAdams & Constantian, 1983), more frequently engage 
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in dyadic as opposed to large group interactions (McAdams, Healy & 
Krause, 1984), and place a great value on trust in friendships (McAdams, 
1984). 
Power motive prompts people toward the separation of self from 
other and context. It is manifested in a preference for feeling strong 
and for m4stering and having an impact on one's environment. Investiga-
tions show that it is associated with a tendency to engage in large-
group rather than dyadic interact ions, and with the adoption of an 
active, assertive or controlling role in friendships (McAdams, Healy & 
Krause, 1984). For men, but not for women, high power motive has been 
found to correlate with aggressiveness, impulsivity and difficulties in 
love relationships (Stewart & Rubin, 1976; Winter, 1973). 
Intimacy and power motives are conceptually related to Bakan' s 
(1966) formulation of agency and communion (McAdams, 1985). Bakan held 
that these two dialectical forces comprise the basic polarity underlying 
all human existence. He regarded them as the two fundamental modalities 
of life. Human beings exist both as individuals via the modality of 
agency, and ·as individuals participating in and belonging to a larger 
group via communion. 
According to Bakan, agency is the modality of separation. It man-
ifests itself in self-protection, self-assertion, self-expansion and the 
urge to master. Psychologically, it is experienced in the differentia-
tion of self from field and in intellectual functions involving separat-
ing and ordering. Agentic interpersonal styles are characterised by 
objectivity, competiiiveness, exclusion and distance. 
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Communion is the modality of non-separation. It involves contact, 
openness, and union with others. Psychologically it is experienced as a 
merging of self and field and as the sense of being at one with others. 
Communion is evidenced in those intellectual functions that are communi-
cative in nature such as verbal and language skills. Communions's pres-
ence is f~lt in those styles of relating that are subjective, coopera-
tive, acc~pting and close. 
Bakan's theory, and also the intimacy and power constructs if they 
are accepted as rough indices of communion and agency, was given impres-
sive support by the series of studies conducted by Carlson (1971). 
These studies were described in Chapter 2 of this paper. Carlson, as 
may be recalled, found that distinct patterns of agency and communion 
were evidenced in subjects' perceptions of themselves, others, and their 
world. His results also indicated that communion was more characteris-
tic of females as a group and agency was more characteristic of males as 
a group. There was considerable overlap between the sexes, however, 
indicating that the relationship between sex and modality (agency or 
communion) was not necessarily true for a given individual. As for 
motive, there is no consistent evidence for sex differences in either 
the strength or frequency of power (Stewart & Chester, 1982) and inti-
macy motives (McAdams, 1984). 
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Motives and Moral Orientation 
Intimacy motive and the care MO emphasize many of the same quali-
ties i.e., those of communion. Power motive and the justice MO both 
emphasize agentic qualities. This might reasonably lead one to expect a 
relationship between MO and motive in the form of care being related to 
intimacy and justice being related to power motive. However, the ques-
tion remains as to the nature of this connection. In other words, what 
is fundamentally common to both motive and MO that results in similar 
emphases in each? The hypothesis adopted here is that motive and MO are 
connected by way of the central roles perception of self and other play 
in each. Both motive and MO revolve around particular conceptualize-
tions and experiences of self, other, and self-other relationships. At 
the heart of power motive and the justice orientation lies the experi-
ence of self as individual and separate from others. For intimacy 
motive and the care orientation, the basic experience of self is as con-
nected and in union with others. Thus, I am assuming that the relation-
ship between motive and moral orientation is mediated by particular per-
ceptions of ·self and world. 
This study will test two hypotheses regarding motive and moral 
orientation. First, it is hypothesized that intimacy motive will be 
correlated with a care orientation to morality. Second, it is expected 
that power motive will be correlated with a justice orientation towards 
morality. 
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Morality, Motive, Ego Development, and Sex 
There are no published studies investigating the relations among 
moral orientation, motive, ego development, and sex. McAdams (1985) 
did, however, assess the relationships of moral orientation as expressed 
in students' religious ideologies to sex and motive. McAdams asked 56 
undergrad~ate students (26 male and 30 female) to complete a series of 
questionn{lires regarding their religious beliefs and religious experi-
ences. These questionnaires included open-ended and multiple choice 
questions and rating-type items. The students were also administered 
the TAT and Loevinger's sentence completion test (WUSCT). McAdams 
devised a scoring system to assess content themes of responsibility, 
compassion, and care (i.e., a care orientation), and themes of rights, 
laws and principles (i.e., a justice orientation) in subjects' respon-
ses. Such themes were found to be present in 45~~ of the students' 
responses. In regards to sex differences, McAdams found that women were 
more likely to emphasize themes of care and responsibility in their 
responses than ·men (43~~ to 19~~. respectively). This result neared sta-
tistical significance. There were no differences in men's and women's 
emphases on content themes of rights, laws, and principles in their per-
sonal religious ideologies. In addition, McAdams found no correlation 
between scores of intimacy and power motivation and moral orientation as 
expressed in religious ideologies. 
Block (1973) also did a study pertinent to the present investiga-
tion. She assessed the relations of agency and communion to sex role, 
moral development and ego development. Block asked male and female uni-
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versity students from 6 different countries (including the U.S.) to 
describe their ideal self by using an Adjective Q-Sort. She found that 
women more frequently chose adjectives reflecting qualities of communion 
(e.g., interdependence, mutuality, and relatedness) while men chose 
those reflecting agentic qualities (e.g., self-assertion and self-exten-
sion). B~ock also predicted that personal maturity would be associated 
with a greater integration of agency and communion within the personal-
ity and this would be reflected in individuals' self-descriptions. 
Using Loevinger's SCT method as an index of maturity she discovered that 
for a sample of 144 male and 141 female high school students, those 
scoring at the Conscientious level (the highest in the sample) did give 
self-descriptions combining both agency and communion. 
If one accepts that communal qualities are emphasized in the care 
MO and agentic qualities in the justice MO, then together these findings 
offer some support for the hypotheses that males will more frequently 
have a justice MO and females a care MO and that the two orientations 
will be integrated by individuals at higher levels of maturity regard-
less of their sex. 
Block also found that integration of agency and communion was 
associated with higher stages of moral development as measured by 
Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview. The problem of sex bias in this 
sample makes interpretation of this finding difficult, however. There 
were 71 males but only 47 females scored at the Principled level (stages 
5 and 6) compared to 105 females and 57 males scored at stage 3. More-
over, the self-descriptions of females at the Principled level suggested 
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only a tendency towards agency. 
The present study differs from Block's both in purpose and in 
method. The overall purpose of this study is to test the hypotheses 
that have been made regarding the separate relations of gender, ego 
maturity and motive to MO. 
CHAPTER IV 
METHOD 
Subjects 
The subjects were 129 students enrolled in any one of several 
introductory psychology courses at a midwestern college. There were 67 
males and 62 females in the sample. The student body at this college is 
ethnically and culturally diverse but with the majority of students 
being white and from the middle class socioeconomic level. All of the 
subjects took the ego development and moral orientation measures. All 
but 30 students were assessed for strength of intimacy and power 
motives. However, due to missing data, the intimacy and power motiva-
tion scores used in the data analysis were from separate groups of stu-
dents. This left a sample of 53 students for whom there were intimacy 
motivation scores and 35 students for whom there were power motive 
scores. Thirty-two subjects were omitted from the sample for the final 
data analysis because either their protocols had been used to derive the 
MOQ scoring system or they had not complied with instructions when com-
pleting the MOQ. 
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Measures 
Sentence Completion Test. (SGT)._ The SGT was devised to assess 
subjects' stage of ego development (Loevinger, 1976). The shortened 
form of the SGT was used in this study (Holt, 1980). It consists of 12 
sentence sterns which the subject completes. Subjects' responses to the 
sentence s~erns are individually scored as being at one of the nine lev-
els of ego development in Loevinger's system. These individual scores 
are then used to determine the subject's core level of ego functioning. 
This final score is considered to be the subject's ego development 
level. 
Thematic Apperception Test. (TAT). The TAT was first designed by 
Henry Murray (1943) as a projective measure of personality characteris-
tics. Subsequent modifications have allowed it to be used as a measure 
of intimacy and power motivation. In the standard group administration, 
subjects write stories in response to each of six pictures. In order of 
administration the pictures are (a) two figures sitting on a bench next 
to a river, '(b) a man sitting at a desk on which is a picture of a fam-
ily, (c) a male ship captain talking to another man, (d) two female sci-
entists in a laboratory, (e) a man and woman on a trapeze, and (f) an 
older man and a younger woman walking through a field with horses and a 
dog. Pictures (a) and (b) can be found in McClelland and Steele (1972) 
and pictures (c), (d) and (e) can be found in McClelland (1975). In 
this study, the same set of pictures was given to both sexes in accor-
dance with McAdams's (1982a) argument that valuable results concerning 
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intimacy and power motivation can be obtained this way provided that the 
pictures do not represent scenes that. are stereoypically masculine or 
feminine. Further, Stewart and Chester (1982) have concluded that the 
sex of the stimulus figures in TAT pictures is usually not a signifi-
cant determinant of variance in motive scores between the sexes. 
Mor~l Orientation Questionnaire. (MOQ). A paper and pencil 
instrument was devised for this study to assess the moral orientation 
construct. The instrument requires subjects to describe four moral 
dilemmas that they had personal experience or knowledge of. In their 
descriptions, subjects are asked to incorporate the answers to each of 
ten questions. These questions focus on those dimensions of moral con-
flicts proposed to be connected to the moral orientation construct. 
These include affective, behavioral, cognitive and relational aspects of 
the conflicts (See Appendix A). 
Six scoring categories were developed on the basis of theoretical 
speculations about the care and justice ethics and an examination of 15 
protocols (60 dilemmas) randomly selected from the entire sample. Each 
category, or scale, was devised to focus on a particular aspect of the 
care or justice orientation. A complete description of the scoring sys-
tem can be found in Appendix B. The names of the scales are listed in 
Table 3. Briefly, scale Relational Dilemma (RD) assesses whether there 
is a person involved in the dilemma who has a significant relationship 
with the subject or to whom the subject expresses concern for or a 
desire to take care of. Score Principled Dilemma (PD) assesses the sub-
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jects use of rules, principles, norms, and standards to describe the 
dilemma. These two scales address the way in which the subject con-
structs the dilemma. The next four scoring categories assess the kinds 
of considerations the subject uses to arrive at a moral decision or 
action. Consequences to Self (CS) refers to the subject's decision to 
act so as to avoid some negative consequence or achieve some positive 
consequence. Concern for Others (CO) refers to both general expressions 
of care and concern for another's well-being and concern about specific 
consequences to the other. Maintenance of Relationship (MR) refers to 
the subject's desire to keep, strengthen, or minimize the conflict in a 
relationship. Empathy (E) refers to a cognitive understanding and/or 
affective experiencing of another's situation. These were not the only 
kinds of considerations subjects cited as reasons for their moral behav-
ior. However, these were chosen as a focus in this study because of 
their expected connection to the care and justice MOs and their ability 
to be scored. Every dilemma was scored on each scale with 1 = presence 
and 0 = absence. These scores were then summed on each scale so that 
every indiv.idual had six final scores (RD, PD, CS, CO, MR, and E 
scores). These separate scores were used in the data analysis. High 
scores on RD, and use of the CO, MR, and E categories were considered to 
indicate use of the care MO. High PD was considered to be indicative of 
a justice orientation. No specific hypotheses were made about the CS 
score. 
Table 3 
MOQ Scales 
RD 
PD 
cs 
co 
MR 
E 
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Relational Dilemma 
Principled Dilemma 
Consequences to self 
Concern for others 
Maintenance of relationship 
Empathy 
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Procedure 
The SCT and MOQ were both administered in the course of a single 
session to groups of 5 to 15 students at a time. All subjects were ini-
tially given a statement of informed consent to read and sign. If, 
after this, they agreed to participate in the study, they were given the 
SCT follo~ed by the MOQ. Subjects were directed to follow the instruc-
tions printed on each measure. The order of presentation remained the 
same for all subjects. The TAT was group administered as part of a sep-
arate research project. 
The SCT was scored in the standard manner by an individual trained 
in the scoring procedure. TAT stories were scored for power and inti-
macy motivation according to the systems devised by Winter (1973) for 
power and McAdams (1980) for intimacy. The TAT coders' agreement with 
expert scoring of practice stories in the scoring manuals met acceptable 
standards for research. 
The MOQ was scored by three individuals, two female and one male, 
according to the instructions reprinted in Appendix B. Interrater reli-
abilities ranged from .94 for the RD category to .68 for PD to the .40's 
for the moral consideration categories. Because of the low base rate of 
occurrence for these latter categories, interrater reliability was also 
computed in terms of percentage of agreement. Results showed that 
interrater agreement for the CS category was 75% and in the 80% to 95% 
range for the remaining categories. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
The numbers and percentages of males and females scored at each 
ego developmental level are presented in Table 4. For the purpose of 
data analysis subjects were divided into High ego (I-4 and above) and 
Low ego (below I-4) groups. A Chi-square analysis was used to evaluate 
any differences in the numbers of males and females in the high versus 
low groups. Results indicated that there were a significantly greater 
number of females at higher ego stages and males at lower ego stages, 
chi-square(l) = 11.38, E <.01. 
Descriptive statistics for males and females on intimacy and power 
motivation are presented in Table 5. The !-tests revealed no signifi-
cant differences in mean scores for males and females on intimacy, 
!(51) = -1.05, ns, or power motive, !(33) = .43, ns. 
Sex Differences 
The first hypothesis proposed that in their descriptions of real-
life moral conflicts females would more frequently use a care MO than 
would males and males would more frequently use a justice MO than 
females. While testing this hypothesis it was decided also to assess 
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Table 4 
Frequencies of Males and Females at Each Ego Stage 
Males Females 
(N = 51) (N = 46) Total 
Ego Stage· F % F % F % 
Delta 1 1% 0 0% 1 1% 
Delta/3 6 12% 1 2% 7 7% 
I-3 12 24% 2 4% 14 14% 
I-3/4 14 28% 11 24% 25 26%. 
I-4 6 12% 22 48% 28 29% 
I-4/5 8 16% 4 9% 12 12% 
I-5 4 8% 6 13% 10 10% 
Table 5 
Comparison of Males and Females on Intimacy and Power Motivation 
Males Females 
(N = 51) (! = 56) 
n M SD Range n M SD Range t 
Intimacy 2.4 4.04 3.14 0-12 29 5.00 3.45 0-13 -1.05, ns 
Power 22 4.63 3.65 0-10 13 4.08 3. 75 0-11 0.43, ns 
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any effects for ego development stage and for an ego by sex interaction. 
Because of the intercorrelated nature. of the scores on the dependent 
measure, a two-way multivariate analysis of variance was performed with 
sex and ego stage as the independent classifying variables. A regres-
sion approach was used to correct for the unequal frequencies of males 
and females at higher versus lower ego stages. Results of the multivar-
iate F tests revealed a main effect for sex across scoring categories, 
£(1,93) = 2.413, £ <.05, but no effect for ego, £(1,93) = 1.15, ns, and 
no interaction £(1,93) = .67, ns. Univariate tests were performed and 
indicated a significant difference for sex on the PD scale, £(1,93) = 
8.87, £ <.01, and a nonsignificant trend on the CO scale, £(1,93) = 
2.86, £ <.09. The means, standard deviations, and ranges for males and 
females, together with the ~esults of the univariate tests are presented 
in Table 6. 
To understand the nature of these differences, the group means for 
males and females in the PD and CO categories, taken separately, were 
compared using !-tests. The results are presented in Table 7. Contrary 
to expectations, females made greater use than males of principles, 
rules, and norms when constructing moral dilemmas, !(95) = -3.13, 
£ <.01. Results also revealed that the trend for a sex difference in CO 
suggested by the univariate analysis favored females, !(95) = -1.72, 
£ <.05. As hypothesized, females more frequently cited concern for 
others as a reason for moral action than did males. 
Table 6 
Comparison of Males and Females bn MOQ Scales 
Males Females 
(!! = 51) (!! = 46) 
M SD Range M SD Range F 
Relational Dilennna (RD) 2.02 .09 0-4 2.26 1.02 0-4 1.26 
Principled Dilennna (PD) 1.59 1.20 0-4 2.39 1. 33 0-4 9.6* 
Consequences to self (CS) 2.59 1.13 0-4 2.47 1.07 0-4 .24 
Concern for Others (CO) .88 • 84 0-3 1.20 .96 0-4 2. 89** 
Maintenance of 
Relationship (MR) .43 • 78 0-3 .52 .69 0-2 • 36 
Empathy (E) .08 .27 0-1 • 07 .25 0-1 .06 
*E.. < .05 
**E.. < .09 
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Table 7 
Comparison of Males and Females on Principled Dilennna (PD) and Concern 
for Others (CO) Scales 
Males Females 
(B_ = 51) (B_ = 46) 
M SD M SD t 
Principled Dilemma (PD) 1.58 1.20 2.39 1.33 -3.13 .001 
Concern for Others (CO) .88 ,84 1.20 • 96 -1. 72 .OS 
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Ego Development 
There were two hypotheses made about the relationship between ego 
development and moral orientation. First, it was proposed that individ-
uals at lower stages of ego development (below I-4) would primarily show 
either a justice or a care orientation in their descriptions of moral 
dilemmas. , Secondly, it was proposed that people at higher ego stages 
(I-4 and above) would show aspects of both the care and justice MOs in 
their descriptions of real-life moral conflicts. 
For the purpose of data analysis the CO and PD scales were chosen 
as the best single representatives of the care and justice MOs, respec-
tively. They were chosen on the basis of theory and a factor analysis 
of the MOQ scales. The factor analysis, with a varimax rotation, 
revealed the presence of three factors. Factor 1 had its highest load-
ings on CO (.79) and RD (.49), Factor 2 on MR (.86) and RD (.50), and 
Factor 3 on E (.81) and PD (.70). Factors 1 and 2 seemed most closely 
associated with the care orientation and therefore CO was chosen to rep-
resent this MO. Factor 3 seemed most closely associated with the jus-
tice ethic, as the empathy scale included the cognitive perspective-
taking congruent with a justice MO. However, the PD scale rather than 
the E scale was chosen to represent the justice ethic because of the low 
frequency of E responses. 
Using the CO and PD scales to represent the care and justice MOs 
respectively, subjects were divided into three groups on the basis of 
their scores in both categories. Subjects who scored above the mean on 
CO and PD were classified as Both (g = 16), those who scored above the 
47 
mean on either CO or PD were classified as One (g = 39), and those who 
did not score above the mean on either category were classified as Nei-
ther (g = 42). Due to some overlap between the PD and CO scales (i.e., 
CO included concern for other's rights) the number of CO responses that 
evidenced concern for other's rights was assessed and these responses 
were not ,included in the subsequent analysis. Elimination of these 
responses did not necessitate any regrouping of the subjects into dif-
ferent MO usage groups. 
A Chi-square analysis was performed to evaluate the proposed dif-
ferences in MO usage. The observed and expected frequencies are shown 
in Table 8. The results of the analysis indicated a significant associ-
ation between ego development and MO use, chi-square(2) = 8.70, E <.05. 
Inspection of Table 8 reveals that the high ego group tended to show 
either concern for others of the use of propositions but not both 
together. There was no significant difference in how frequently this 
group used the care MO versus the justice MO. If the CO and PD scales 
are accepted as representing the care and justice MOs, then it appears 
that contrary to expectations, the high ego group tended to make use of 
one MO predominantly while the low ego group did not use either MO to 
any significant extent. The two ego groups did not differ in their use 
of both orientations. Thus, neither hypothesis was supported. 
Table 8 
Analysis of Moral Orientation Usage by Ego Development Level 
Orientation Usage 
Ego Group. Both One Neither 
High 9 26 15 
Expected = 8.25 E = 17 E = 24.7 
Low 7 13 27 
Expected = 7.75 E = 15.99 E = 23.26 
Note: Both Persons above the mean on care and justice orientation 
usage. 
One = Persons above the mean on either care or justice 
orientation usage. 
Neither = Persons not above the mean on either one. 
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Power and Intimacy Motivation 
There were two hypotheses made regarding motive and moral orienta-
tion. First, it was hypothesized that intimacy motivation would be cor-
related with a care orientation to morality. Second, it was proposed 
that power motivation would be positively correlated with a justice MO. 
To evaluate the relationships between the two motives and the two 
MOs, a Pearson correlation analysis was performed. The correlations are 
presented in Table 9. Results indicated that intimacy was positively 
correlated with PD, !(51) = .245, E <.05, and MR scores, !(51) = .315, 
E <.01. In addition, intimacy motivation showed a nonsignificant neg-
«. ative correlation with Empathy scores, !(51) = -.191, E < .09. Power 
motivation was found to have a significant positive association with CO 
scores, !(33) = .288, E <.05, and a significant: negative correlation 
with CS scores, !(33) = -.305, E <.05. No other significant correla-
tions were found. 
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Table 9 
Correlations of Intimacy and Power with Moral Orientation Scores 
Intimacy Power 
(!!_ = 53) (!!_ = 35) 
Relational Dielmma (RD) 
-.128 .088 
Principled Dilemma (PD) .245* .000 
Consequences to Self (CS) .044 -.305* 
Concern for Others (CO) . 004 .288* 
Maintenance of Relationship (MR) .315** .017 
Empathy (E) -.191 -.064 
*E. < .OS 
**E. < .01 
CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION 
Before discussing the results of this study, there are several 
methodological problems that need to be addressed. These problems lie 
with the 'dependent measure, the Moral Orientation Questionnaire. The 
open-ended questions on the MOQ allow maximum freedom for subjects to 
respond and provide fewer prompts than an interview format. However, 
they also have the disadvantages of being more difficult to score and 
hence less reliable. Only one scale, RD, was found to have a high 
interrater reliability. The other category scales were found to be only 
satisfactory in terms of interrater 
interrater agreement. 
reliability and percentage of 
A second problem with the MOQ is the unknown validity of the scor-
ing categories. The scales were derived on the basis of theory and data 
but their validity has not been assessed. The very broadness of some 
of the category scales makes it difficult to specify accurately what 
they are measuring. Of course, success or failure in finding the 
expected relationships between the MOQ scales and other, reliable meas-
ures can itself be an indication of validity. 
The methodological weaknesses of this study make any interpreta-
tion of these results highly speculative. With that caveat in mind, the 
following tentative interpretations are made. 
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Sex Differences 
The first hypothesis stated that_ females would show greater evi-
dence of a care orientation in their moral conflicts than males, and 
males would show greater evidence of a justice orientation in their 
dilemmas than would females. The lack of a significant sex difference 
on all but one of the MOQ scales suggests that this is not the case. 
This is further indicated by the finding that the women in this sample 
made greater use of rules, norms, and principles to construct their 
dilemmas than did males. This suggests that not only do women sometimes 
use a justice orientation, which is in keeping with the findings of 
other research (Lyons, 1983), but that they may make greater use of some 
aspects of the justice ethic than do men. 
Males and females in this sample did not differ in their use of a 
desire to maintain a relationship as a reason for moral action, nor in 
their use of an empathic reaction as a moral consideration. This lack 
of sex differences in empathy is in contradiction to the results of 
Gibbs, Arnold, and Burkhart (1984) and Hoffman (1977). However, Gibbs 
et al. found this difference only for people who scored at Kohlberg's 
Stage 3 level of moral development. The subjects in the present study 
were not divided into moral development levels and therefore any sex 
differences in empathy in this sample may have been obscured. The 
definition of empathy employed in this study was not the same as that 
adopted by Hoffman. Hoffman (1979, p. 713) defines empathy as a II • vicar-
ious affective response to another" and distinguishes it from a cogni-
tive awareness of another's feelings. Since in this study, cognitive 
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understanding was not differentiated from affective response, its 
results are not comparable to Hoffman's research. Future studies of 
empathy and morality would do well to take this distinction into account 
as Hoffman's definition of empathy appears logically related to the care 
MO and the conception of cognitive perspective-taking to a justice 
orientation. 
Women did take moral action out of consideration for the welfare 
of others more frequently than did men. This trend, although nonsigni-
ficant, provides partial support for the original hypotheses. If one 
considers this in connection with the finding that women in this sample 
.:;also make greater use of principles and norms than did men, however, 
other, alternative interpretations emerge. One possibility is that due 
to some sex-specific deveJ opmental shift during this age range women 
make greater use of both orientations than do men at this age range. 
Another, perhaps more plausible interpretation is derived from Broughton 
(1983). Broughton argues that despite Gilligan's assertion that women 
construe moral situations in concrete, contextual and relativistic ways, 
in actuality she accords the virtues of care and responsibility the 
status of absolute, prescriptive, and universal principles. As such, 
her conception of a care orientation to morality resembles the justice-
oriented morality of Kohlberg. This study did not divide subjects into 
hierarchical stages of development within the justice and care orienta-
tions and therefore does not address the issue of increased abstraction 
and universality at higher stages of moral development. The results do 
suggest, however, that women may use prescriptive norms and principles 
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to express a care ethic, and point to the need for further research to 
clarify the issue of contextualism versus universality and to more 
fully distinguish a care from a justice orientation. 
Ego Development 
This study revealed an association between ego development and 
moral orientation but not in the predicted direction. Individuals who 
scored at higher ego stages did not use both orientations together more 
frequently than did those who scored at lower ego stages. People at 
higher ego stages did, however, show greater use of a single orientation 
in their descriptions of moral dilemmas than did people at lower ego 
stages. A significant number of individuals at lower ego stages failed 
to evidence any distinct moral orientation in their moral conflicts. 
The meaning of these findings is unclear. They support Loevinger's 
(1976) assertion that there is greater differentiation at higher ego 
stages but do not support the prediction of greater integration at 
these.stages. It appears that individuals at high ego stages tend to 
recognize and use elements of one or both MOs while people at low ego 
stages tend 'to approach moral conflicts in a diffuse and vague manner. 
This may be a function of differentiation, so that there is failure to 
recognize distinct orientations at lower ego development levels. One 
mark of ego maturity can be the degree to which an individual has basic 
life commitments, including ethical commitments (Bourne, 1978). It may 
be that people at high ego development levels not only recognize dis-
tinct aspects of a moral orientation but also commit themselves to their 
use. As Emmerich and Goldman (1983) point out; moral commitment is 
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essential to moral behavior. This commitment may be due to the greater 
internalization that takes place at higher ego levels or to the achieve-
ment of a stable, coherent, ego identity (Bourne, 1978). It would be 
informative to assess the relationship between moral development or 
moral orientation and ego maturity level as assessed by other ego devel-
opmental measures such as Marcia's Identity Status Interview (1966) to 
see what role commitment, and commitment to certain values plays in mor-
ality. 
The problem of possible sex bias in this sample (e.g., the greater 
number of females in the high ego group) makes the above interpretations 
.of the results concerning ego development and moral orientation uncer-
i·~ '; 
tain. It is unknown how this bias may have affected the results. 
Future investigations of ego development and morality should investigate 
the effect of sex, perhaps by having equivalent numbers of males and 
females at each ego stage level. This would help clarify the role of 
sex (if any) in the relationship between moral and ego development. 
Intimacy and Power Motivation 
Support for a connection between intimacy motivation and the care 
MO was found in only one category. Intimacy motivation was positively 
associated with the maintenance and preservation of a relationship as a 
reason for making a particular moral decision. This is consistent with 
a conception of intimacy as involving a preference for connection. 
However, the expected association between intimacy motivation and a con-
cern for others' well-being was not found. This result conflicts with 
those of a study by McAdams, Healy, and Krause (1984) which found inti-
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macy motivation to be associated with an emphasis on trust and concern 
for the well-being of others as reasons for friendship. 
There is a posiible explanation for this contradiction. It may be 
that concern for others is most frequently seen in personally meaningful 
relationships. Intimacy motive has been linked to a tendency to engage 
in dyadic relationships (Mcadams, Healy & Krause, 1984) and in this 
study it was expected that intimacy motivation would be associated with 
moral conflicts in which the dilemma involved a problem in significant 
relationships. This was not found and, in fact, there was a negative 
although nonsignificant correlation between intimacy motivation and 
·relational dilemmas. Instead, intimacy motivation was connected to 
conflicts involving the rules, principles and norms characteristic of a 
justice ethic. Perhaps intimacy motivation is associated with a ten-
dency not to see conflicts in significant interpersonal relationships as 
moral problems, or perhaps there are fewer conflicts in the relation-
ships of people high in intimacy motivation. Research has shown that 
high intimacy motivation is related to more positive affect and per-
ceived harmony in relationships (McAdams & Constantian, 1983) and this 
may partly account for the negative correlation between intimacy motiva-
tion and relational dilemmas found in this study. 
The kind of experience that subjects were asked to describe may 
also have affected the results. McAdams (19 82) found that intimacy 
motivation was associated with intimacy themes in subects' memories of 
peak experiences, satisfying experiences and great learning experiences, 
but not with memories of neutral or unpleasant experiences . Also, 
• 
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intimacy motivation is conceived of as corresponding to a communal 
approach in relationships; one that is marked by being rather than 
doing, and research supports this (McAdams, Healy & Krause, 1984). In 
this study subjects were asked to describe relatively unpleasant (i.e., 
conflictual) experiences that involved some action on their part. The 
elements of action and unpleasantness may partially explain the failure 
to find the expected relationship between intimacy motive and certain 
aspects of the care orientation. 
The proposed connection between power motivation and the justice 
orientation was not substantiated. Power motivation was not associated 
~;with the use of rules, principles and standards, nor with concern for 
one's own welfare. Thus, the elements of self-protection and objectiv-
ity thought to be linked with power motive were not expressed in this 
samples' moral conflicts. Further, power motivation was found to have a 
significant positive correlation with concern for other's welfare as a 
basis for moral action. This finding contradicts the original hypothe-
sis but is in keeping with the agentic ways that power motivation can be 
manifested ~n relationships e.g., taking charge of a situation, assum-
ing resgonsibility, and helping another. As McAdams (1985) points out, 
helping is an active assertion of the self. It may be that power moti-
vation is frequently manifested in giving and helping behaviors whenever 
socialization experiences have fostered the development of a caring ori-
entation toward weaker others (McClelland, 1975). There is some support 
for this possibility. McAdams (1984a) found that individuals high in 
power motivation described the high points of their friendships as those 
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times when one friend offered to help the other. To better understand 
the relationship between power motivation and helping, it would be help-
ful to know the reasons behind high power individuals' desires to help 
others. Perhaps such a desire is due to a preference for feeling strong 
and having an impact on others. Or perhaps it is a specific kind of 
concern for others, a concern that is limited to those who are perceived 
as being in a hierarchical relationship with the helper e.g., weaker, 
less able. It would be interesting to discover the differences between 
the concern for others evidenced by people high in power motivation as 
compared to those high in intimacy motivation, and the differences in 
·the kinds of helping behaviors they might exhibit. This might also 
help clarify how concern for others might be expressed differently in 
the care and justice MOs. 
In summary, there was no evidence to support the hypotheses con-
cerning power motivation and the care and justice ethics and only meager 
support for the hypothesis that intimicy motivation would be positively 
associated with a care MO. Before completing this discussion of the 
results concerning intimacy and power motivation and their relationships 
to the care and justice MOs, it is necessary to point out another limi-
tation of the present study. The power and intimacy motive scores used 
in the analysis were those of separate individuals and therefore it was 
impossible to compare the combined effects of the two motives. Future 
research should attempt to look at high and low levels of both motives 
in combination to see how they are related to moral reasoning and behav-
ior. 
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Concluding Comments 
The major hypotheses of this stu.dy concerning the separate rela-
tionships between moral orientation and gender, ego development stage, 
and intimacy and power motivation were, for the most part, not sup-
ported. However, due to the questionable reliability and unknown valid-
ity of the dependent measures this study may not have been an adequate 
test of the relationships between these factors and moral orientation. 
To make such a test, a standardized, reliable and valid measure of the 
care orientation needs to be devised. Lyons (1983) has taken the first 
step in this direction. She has developed a scoring system and semi-
.- structured interview method that, she proposes, assesses moral orienta-
,.~:; 
tion and perceptions of self and self-other relationships. This meas-
ure should be tested for reliability and validity and made available to 
other researchers to make further tests. At the present time there is 
little empirical evidence to support Gilligan's thesis that a care ori-
entation exists, and the availability of a standardized measure of the 
care MO would help answer this question. Given a standardized assess-
ment instrument, researchers might investigate the relationships between 
a care orientation and affective responses, empathy, helping and other 
behaviors, social desirability, prosocial moral reasoning (Eisenberg-
Berg, 1979), interpersonal moral reasoning (Haan, 1978), as well as the 
factors examined in this study, in order to delineate more clearly what 
a care orientation is. It would also be important to determine how such 
a measure relates to Kohlberg' s system of assessment. Longitudinal 
studies would also be necessary to determine whether or not the stage 
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sequence described by Gilligan is actually exhibited in subjects' lives. 
Gilligan's claim of sex differences also requires closer examina-
tion, as her claim lacks any strong support. It will be necessary to 
assess the relative importance of biological, psychological and socio-
cultural factors in moral understanding and behavior. As Reimer (1983) 
notes, "the values and qualities associated with women are not psycho-
logically predetermined and inevitable but also related to complex 
social and cultural factors'' (p. 5). Many have emphasized the important 
influence that the societal and cultural environment has on an individu-
al' s development (Brabeck, 1983; Miller, 1976). It may be that the 
socio-cultural context of peoples' development is a more critical factor 
in their moral orientation than is biological sex. One way to investi-
gate this would be to assess the moral orientations exhibited by males 
and females from different age cohorts and cultures. 
The larger and most fundamental question that needs to be 
addressed by research concerns the relationship between Gilligan's con-
ception of a care ethic and the justice- and reason- oriented morality 
embodied in Kohl berg's system. Gilligan originally seemed to propose 
the care orientation as something distinct (at least in the initial 
stages of development) from the justice MO. This is questionable. 
Rather than discovering a new kind of morality, Gilligan's greatest con-
tribution seems to have been to broaden our conception of moral develop-
ment and what is true about morality (Brabeck, 1983; Kohlberg, 1982). 
The care and justice ethics both speak to fundamental but in some 
ways opposing aspects of human life. Kohlberg's model reflects ration-
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ality, justice, universality, the primacy of the individual, the need 
for independence and autonomy. Gilligan's theory adds to and comple-
ments Kohlberg's system by bringing in affect, care, context, relation-
ships, and the needs for interdependence and connection. Kohl berg 
focuses on what one "should" do as being universally morally right, and 
Gilligan focuses on what one "would" do in a specific moral context 
(Kohlberg, 1982). But these do not appear to be two different kinds of 
morality but rather different aspects of one larger morality that inte-
grates reason with affect, autonomy with connection, content with struc-
ture, and judgment with action. The task that now lies before theoreti-
cians and researchers is to integrate Kohlberg's and Gilligan's theories 
into a single conception of morality (Brabeck, 1983) and, just as it is 
the developmental task of every individual, to unite care with justice. 
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MORAL ORIENTATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
This is a questionnaire about morality. Its purpose is to dis-
cover the kinds of moral conflicts that people experience in their lives 
and how they deal with and think about those conflicts. On the follow-
ing pages please describe 4 of the most significant moral conflicts that 
you have faced in your life, at least 2 of which have occurred within 
the last two years. By moral conflicts we mean situations in which you 
faced a dilemma concerning right and wrong, good and bad. Be sure to 
describe real situations that you have experienced. Describe each situ-
ation in detail (one per page), answering the following questions: 
When and where did the conflict take place? 
What events led up to the conflict? What caused it? 
Who , if anybody, was responsible for the conflict having occur-
red? 
If there were other people involved, who were they and what was 
their relationship to you? 
Why did the situation represent a moral conflict to you? 
How did you deal with the conflict? 
Why did you deal with it in that way? 
What kinds of things were important in making your decision? 
What was the outcome of the dilemma? 
How do you feel about the outcome? 
Remember, describe each situation as it really happened, not as you 
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think it should have happened. We are interested in experiences and 
there are no right or wrong experiences. Please do not identify your-
self or others in your accounts. 
tial. 
All responses will remain confiden-
APPENDIX B 
I. Give each dilemma a score in both categories. 
Relational Dilemma. (RD). 
2-- The dilennna involves at least one of the following (A or B): 
A). a significant personal relationship 
e.g., family member, lover, good friend, boy/girl friend, 
mentor 
B). the subject clearly expresses concern about harming or 
hurting the there; or, responsibility to care for or in 
some way give to the other 
1-- Neither A nor B 
Principled Dilemma. (PD). 
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2-- The subject states or strongly implies an abstract principle, law, 
social or institutional norm that tells how one should or ought 
to act. It is a standard for behavior. The subject may imply 
amoral proposition by using words such as "believe," "taught," 
"right," and "wrong" 
Examples for scoring PD = 2 
It is wrong to (cheat, steal, 'do that', etc.) 
People shouldn't steal, cheat, etc., 
=-=---wouldn't be right, fair, just, etc., 
I've always believed that 
---My parents always told me 
I was taught that 
I've been brought up to 
---I've never agreed with . (premarital sex, stealing, etc.) 
One should help others. 
Children should obey their parents. 
Life is more important than liberty or happiness. 
Honesty is the best policy. 
When one makes an agreement, one sticks with it. 
is a sin. 
--- is against the Church. 
-...,--
It's against my principles, beliefs, etc. 
I've always been against (stealing, hurting people, drugs) 
I didn't think it was right to 
---
1~ No moral proposition is put forth or implied. 
CONSIDERATIONS 
II. Score any of the following types of considerations that the 
subject uses to make his/her decision. Considerations are what 
the subject states are his reasons for deciding to act in a 
certain way. The subject may use more than one category of 
considerations. Score each category that applies. If the 
subject does not use any of the categories listed, than do not 
score anything. 
Categories and Examples 
Consequences to the Subject. (CS). 
The subject decides on an act in order to experience positive and/or 
avoid negative consequences. i.e., in order to gain something or to 
avoid losing something. The focus is on how the subject would be 
affected. 
Types of consequences include: 
Affective: pleasant or unpleasant feelings. Moral emotions such as 
guilt, shame, pride in oneself, etc. are not included 
in this category. 
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Material: loss or gain of money, material goods, social position, etc. 
Physical: health concerns, physical danger 
Others' 
Reactions: gain or loss of others' approval or acceptarice; to avoid 
negative emotional reaction in the other because the 
emotion will be turned against the subject. e.g., fear 
that if the other is made angry he will retaliate against 
the subject. 
Other examples 
Affective 
for: 
fun, excitement 
enjoyment 
a thrill 
good times 
the "experience" 
to avoid: 
boredom 
sadness 
doing something hateful or distasteful 
feeling stupid 
embarassmen t 
because of fear (not specified) 
Material 
consequences that concern loss or gain of: 
money 
goods 
possessions 
status 
power convenience e.g., It would be difficult, hard, inconvenient ••• 
reward 
school grades 
compensations for subject's effort 
a job 
influence 
to avoid "getting in trouble" 
Physical 
phrases such as: 
would be bad for them 
would make them sick 
it's unhealthy 
good for their body 
might get them pregnant 
would be physically dangerous 
unsafe 
might get hurt 
not good for them 
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an indication that they've seen the ill effects of some action on others 
e.g., what drinking has done for their friends 
Others' Reactions 
to gain (or avoid losing) others' 
approval 
acceptance 
affection 
trust 
r!';, 
respect 
liking 
to avoid: 
being laughed at 
rejection 
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being disappointed by someone 
being blamed, chastised, punished, retaliated against 
making the other angry, mad, upset, hostile (not because of concern 
for how the other is affected by the emotion but because of how 
the subject will be affected) 
fear of what the other would 'think' of them 
other phrases indicating CS: 
I wouldn't want to end up that way 
Concern for Others. (CO), 
The subject decides on the basis of the consequences to anothE<r person 
or group of people. 
Others' rights; 
Others' affective 
so as not to violate others' rights or to promote 
their rights. Matters of justice or~airness to 
the other. 
states: The subject focuses on the impact of the 
~~~~~~~~~~~~-
Others' needs: 
Rights 
other persons' feelings on that person. This 
is a selfless concern in that the subject is not 
worried about how the other person will react 
toward the subject. e.g., He/she/they/would feel 
angry, hurt, upset, bad, or happy, good 
(physical, emotional, material) 
The other needs or lacks something and/or could 
potentially benefit from the subjects' actions. 
It would be unfair or unjust to them 
They don't deserve that 
It would be taking advantage of them 
Affect 
It would make them feel better 
I don't want to hurt, upset them 
She wouldn't be happy 
to restore harmony in the group 
to help everyone get along 
Needs 
they can't take care of themselves 
they need money, a favor 
they need blood, a transplant 
he'd be in danger 
she needs my help 
I don't want to see them get in trouble (ruin their life) 
General 
because I care about them 
Maintenance of Relationship. (MR). 
The subject focuses on the relationship itself, and not on any single 
person involved. e.g., the friendship, marriage, love relationship, 
etc. 
The subject 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Examples 
acts in order to: 
avoid loss of the relationship or 
minimize conflict for the sake of the relationship or 
strengthen the relationship 
We will be better friends 
we are so close 
I don't want to lose him/her 
the time we share together is so important 
because we are friends 
Empathy. (E). 
The subject clearly expresses empathy for the other person. They show 
that they understand and/or sympathize (empathize) with the other's 
situation and feelings. 
Examples 
I knew (understood) how he felt 
I put myself in her place 
I could see their position 
I'd feel pretty bad/good if •..• (whatever happened to the other) 
I could imagine what it was like 
I knew it must be terrible 
If I was in his place I'd ...• 
I sympathized with them 
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